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THE RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF JOHN STUART MILL
Wilford N. Paul, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
The University of New Mexico, 1972
The main problem I undertake to solve is the proper interpretation
of what Mill's religious views were.

A large number of conflicting and

contradictory interpretations has appeared since the publication of Mill's
Three Essays on Religion in 1874.

And the many publications attending the

recent revival of interest in Mill have contained little substantial help
respecting this problem.

My procedure is first to delineate the dominant

modes of thought that influenced Mill during the first thirty years or
so of his life.

Turning next to Mill's writings specifically on the

subject of religion, I discuss his conception of the general problem of
religion.

This discussion, together with the preceding one, reveal three

strands of thought in Mill's religious philosophy:

the theistic or

rationalistic, the emotive or aesthetic, and the moral.

In the third part

of the study I concentrat:e 1 ,pon the first-of these motifs, upon Mill's
analysis of the rational grounds for theism.
the design argument for God's existence.

This discussion centers in

In the last part of the study I

discuss all three components of Mill's philosophy of religion, criticizing
his conclusion that he has shown the design argument possesses sufficient
strength satisfactorily to serve as rational grounds for supernatural
hopes.

I conclude that, in strictness, Mill does not advocate a religion

of imaginative hope, as is frequently thought, but a religion of imaginative
wish.

Finally I argue that Mill's religious views are properly designated

as theistic humanism, and that this is their only proper designation.

